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Abstract: With the existence of uncertain demands and competitors, a seller’s
inventory control policy for perishable products can significantly affect the
seller and consumers due to its effects on the seller’s revenue, transferred
demand, and product availability. In this paper, we consider two sellers
selling substitutable products in a market where the ordering requests from
different fare classes arrive concurrently. We formulate this problem as
a two-player two-fare-class dynamic inventory control game, and examine
the optimal accept/reject policies in both non-cooperative and cooperative
situations. Our results shed light on three issues: the impact of transferred
demand on a seller’s revenue, the structure of the optimal inventory control
policy, and the importance of cooperation for sellers in the presence of
transferred demand.
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1 Introduction
Offering differentiated prices for the same product to different market segments is
a common strategy for a perishable product seller to lure customers and improve
revenues. The customers of a particular fare class are subjected to various restrictions.
For example, a discount-fare class customer may be required to purchase the product
(e.g., airline ticket) days or even weeks in advance. When a discount-fare class customer
arrives, the seller is faced with the decision of whether to accept that request or reject
it in the hope of selling the product to a full-fare class customer later. If too many of
the discount-fare class customers are accepted during the early selling period, requests
for the full-fare product that arrive later will have to be rejected due to the stockout of
the product.
The basic question in the perishable product inventory control is, therefore, to decide
on whether to accept or reject a discount-fare class customer when s/he arrives at
some point in time during the selling period. This problem is complicated due to the
high uncertainty of arrival patterns of the ordering requests from various fare classes.
Especially, a decision maker might revise the acceptance policy dynamically as new
information becomes available. In the literature, a number of papers examine approaches
for treating various aspects of the static problem, for example, Bitran and Gilbert (1996),
Littlewood (1972), Netessine and Shumsky (2002), Ovchinnikov (2011), Song and Parlar
(2012) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). These static models try to solve the optimal
price to charge each segment and the optimal limit for each fare class, under the
assumption that the ordering requests from different fare classes arrive in sequence, in
which the discount-fare class customers arrive earlier than the full-fare class customers.
Another stream of study considers the situation that ordering requests for different
fare classes occur concurrently. The model developed by Gerchak et al. (1985) is
regarded as the first dynamic model that deals with the concurrent demand problem in
revenue management applications, see, e.g., Monahan et al. (2004) and Xiao and Yang
(2010). This model is motivated by a real situation observed at a delicateseen store
where the manager felt it might be more profitable sometimes if he refused the request
for a bagel from a low-revenue customer and later offered the bagel to a high-revenue
customer. The authors assume that the time horizon is divided into discrete intervals,
where in each interval, the arrival rates of the full-fare and discount-fare class customers
are known, and the time interval is short enough to make the probability of more
than one customer arriving in any interval negligible. Since the introduction of such a
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dynamic model by Gerchak et al. (1985), the model has been extended by Brumelle and
Walczak (2003), Lee and Hersh (1993) and You (2003) to consider more than two-fare
classes and possible buy-up actions of lower fare classes. In all these models, the state
of the ordering process is monitored over time, and the decision on the acceptance of a
particular ordering request when it arrives is based on the state of the ordering process at
that point in time. Interested readers may refer to McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004) and Weatherford and Bodily (1992) for comprehensive reviews
of revenue management techniques in theory and practice.
Most of the extant models on inventory rationing problems investigate the capacity
control of one resource. In practice, a perishable product seller’s accept/reject decision
may be influenced by the decision of other sellers who provide the same or substitutable
products, and hence a competition exists among these sellers. Parlar (1988) introduces
a game theoretical approach to model the substitutable product inventory problem.
Lippman and McCardle (1997) propose a model for the situation where the demand is
allocated to sellers according to a predetermined splitting rule. All these works establish
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. Netessine and Shumsky (2005) model a
seat inventory control problem in which two airlines compete for passengers on the
same flight leg. Even though they evaluate both the direction and magnitude of revenue
losses due to competition, they do not explicitly take into account the cost savings in a
cooperative situation and their effects on the decisions. In addition, they assume that the
fraction of denied customers who are lost to both airlines is zero, which indicates all
rejected customers by one airline will switch to the other one. Song and Parlar (2012)
model a hotel revenue management problem with the consideration of rejection costs of
transferred customers. They investigate equilibrium solutions for three games:
1 a Nash game
2 a Stackelberg game in which one hotel acts as the ‘leader’ and the other as the
‘follower’
3 a cooperative game.
However, these game models deal with problems in which ordering requests from
different fare classes arrive in sequence. The solutions are static and the decisions in
the models are ordering limits or protection levels.
Chen et al. (2006) develop a model in which two physical retailers sell their
(substitutable) products to either in-store customers at a high price or online customers at
a low price. In a non-cooperative game setting, they establish the equilibrium of dynamic
rationing decisions for the two retailers. Furthermore, they find that each retailer’s
objective function is concave in its own inventory level and the initial inventory level
of each retailer is decreasing in that of the other retailer. In recent years, game theoretic
methods have been used to explore various inventory control problems. For instance,
Liu et al. (2013) study a newsvendor game in which two substitutable products are sold
by two newsvendors with loss-averse preferences. They find that, when the effect of loss
aversion on the order quantity is strong enough to dominate the effect of competition,
the total inventory level of a decentralised supply chain will be lower than that of a
centralised supply chain. Fang (2012) considers an n-firm inventory game with uncertain
demands which follow a general continuous joint distribution. Each firm determines
its production quantity to maximise the expected profit which is dependent upon the
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availability of all other products in the complementary set offered by the other firms.
The author formulates the problem as a non-cooperative game and characterises Nash
equilibrium(s) of the game. Korpeoglu et al. (2012) study a non-cooperative game
of replenishment by n firms in an EOQ-like setting. They characterise the behaviour
and outcomes in undominated Nash equilibria by which each firm determines whether
to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to
contribute to joint ordering costs in the case of cooperation. Honhon et al. (2012) present
the optimal solution to a sourcing problem faced by a firm that seeks to procure a
product or a component from a pool of alternative suppliers with preference ordering.
They show that the portfolio structure of the problem consists of a subset of suppliers
that are ordered by their underage and overage costs.
In this paper, we consider a situation in which the ordering requests from different
fare classes arrive concurrently and two sellers compete or cooperate with each other.
Therefore, a seller’s decision concerning accepting or rejecting an ordering request
depends on the time at which the request arrives, and on the inventory levels of both
sellers at that time point. One seller’s inventory level at a specific time might affect
another seller’s decision because of the existence of transferred customers. The rest of
the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present our model, and analyse two
sellers’ objective functions and best responses for the cases in which one or both sellers
have inventory in a period. We then examine the model using Nash and cooperative
strategies in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In each section, we discuss the results and
managerial insights along with numerical examples. In Section 5, we summarise the
paper and discuss some future research directions.
2 The model
We consider two sellers (denoted as players P1 and P2) selling substitutable products
in a market, where the ordering requests from different fare classes arrive concurrently.
A player’s accept/reject decision of an ordering request depends on the time at which
the request arrives, and on the inventory levels of both players at that time point. One
player’s inventory at a specific time might affect the other player’s decision because
of the existence of transferred customers. We develop a discrete-time dynamic game to
obtain an optimal policy for making accept/reject decisions. Our model differs from the
model by Chen et al. (2006) in that we assume the probability that a customer rejected
by one player transfers to the other player (i.e., the transfer rate) can be between zero
and one. And a rejection cost is incurred when a customer is rejected by a player. These
assumptions make our model more general in practice. In addition, we obtain some
results that do not appear in Chen et al. (2006).
Each player has a certain amount of products to sell within a finite time period. The
customers belong to two classes: the low-fare class (L) and the high-fare class (H), who
are charged the discounted price and the full price, respectively. The finite selling period
is divided into T equal time intervals that are short enough to make the probability of
more than one customer arriving in each interval negligible. Throughout the paper, we
refer to a time interval as a time period and index the T time periods from T to 1, with
period 1 as the last period. In addition, we make the following assumptions:
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1 the customer arrival patterns are known to both players
2 the prices of two-fare classes for both players are constant and known.
3 there is no buy-up when a low-fare customer is rejected
4 each customer demands for a single unit of product
5 a rejection cost is only incurred by a player’s own customers when the player still
has inventory.
Each player maximises her expected revenue by determining an accept/reject policy for
any combination of the inventory levels and the time remaining. We use the following
notation with i = 1; 2, and K = L;H:
 iK : probability of arrival (arrival rate) of the player Pi’s own K-fare class
customer in any given interval
 riK : unit revenue generated by the player Pi’s K-fare class customer
 ciK : rejection cost per K-fare class customer of the player Pi
 iK : probability of transfer (transfer rate) if a K-fare class customer is rejected
by the player Pi
 ni : player Pi’s inventory level.
Referring to Figure 1, we note that in each period, only one player can receive an
ordering request. If she rejects it, the rejected customer may become a transferred
customer who will seek a product from the other player, or choose to leave the system.
Therefore, in each period, the players have to make decisions on whether to accept or
to reject the ordering request upon its arrival. Obviously, a player will not reject any
high-fare customer unless she is stock out. However, she may reject a low-fare customer
in case her product can be sold to a more profitable customer in a later period. Thus,
the decisions of the player Pi (for i = 1; 2) in any period are
xiL =

1, Pi accepts her own low-fare customer, if any,
0, Pi rejects her own low-fare customer, if any;
and
yiL =

1, Pi accepts a transferred low-fare customer, if any,
0, Pi rejects a transferred low-fare customer, if any.
Defining Vi (t; ni; nj) as the maximum expected revenue of Pi when Pi and Pj start
with ni and nj units of products, respectively, and there are t time intervals remaining
until the end of the selling period, we can formulate our problem under two situations:
1 only one player has inventory in period t
2 both players have inventories in period t.
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Figure 1 Customer flows in the model
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2.1 Case 1: Only one player has inventory in period t
Without loss of generality, we assume that P1 has n1 > 0 units of products in period t
while P2 has sold out all of her products (i.e., n2 = 0). In this case, P2 has to reject
all ordering requests due to stock out, and P1’s decisions will have no effect on P2’s
expected revenue. Then, P2’s expected revenue is V2 (t; n1; 0) = 0 for all n1 and t < T .
Because customers may transfer from P2 to P1, there are five situations in which P1
has to make decisions on x1L and y1L, as illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, P1’s expected
revenue is calculated as
V1 (t; n1; 0)
= max
x1L;y1L
f(1  1L   1H   2L2L   2H2H)V1 (t  1; n1; 0)
+ (1H + 2H2H) [r1H + V1 (t  1; n1   1; 0)]
+ 1Lx1L [r1L + V1 (t  1; n1   1; 0)]
+ 1L (1  x1L) [V1 (t  1; n1; 0)  c1L]
+ 2L2Ly1L [r1L + V1 (t  1; n1   1; 0)]
+ 2L2L (1  y1L)V1 (t  1; n1; 0)g,
(1)
with V1 (0; n1; 0) = 0 for all n1  0.
Using the result in (1), we can generalise Pi’s expected revenue when n1 > 0 and
n2 = 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
Vi (t; ni; 0)
= max
xiL;yiL
[(1  iH   jLjLyiL   jHjH   iLxiL)Vi (t  1; ni; 0)
+ (iH + jHjH + jLjLyiL + iLxiL)Vi (t  1; ni   1; 0)
+ (iLxiL + jLjLyiL) riL + (iH + jHjH) riH
  iL (1  xiL) ciL],
(2)
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with Vi (0; ni; 0) = 0 for all ni  0. In order to investigate the decision rule of Pi and
the properties of Vi (t; ni; 0), we introduce three important definitions.
Figure 2 P1’s expected revenue when P2’s products are sold out
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Definition 2.1: Define
i (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t; ni   1; nj)
for ni; nj  1 as Pi’s expected marginal value of an extra product in period t when Pi
and Pj have inventory levels of ni and nj , respectively.
Definition 2.2: Define
i (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t; ni; nj   1)
for ni; nj  1 as Pi’s expected marginal value resulting from Pj having an extra
product in period t when Pi and Pj have inventory levels of ni and nj , respectively.
Definition 2.3: Define
i (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t; ni; nj)  Vi (t  1; ni; nj)
for ni; nj  1 as Pi’s expected opportunity cost of holding ni units of product from
period t to period t  1.
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For Pi’s problem defined in (2), we can find the optimal decision rules of Pi as follows.
Proposition 1: When Pj is stock out (i.e., nj = 0) but Pi has ni > 0 products at the
beginning of period t, Pi should
1 accept any low-fare ordering request if i (t  1; ni; 0) < riL
2 accept her own low-fare ordering request but reject the transferred low-fare
ordering request if riL  i (t  1; ni; 0) < riL + ciL
3 reject any low-fare ordering request if riL + ciL  i (t  1; ni; 0).
Proof: We first consider the results for i = 1, i.e., only P1 has positive
inventory. The results for i = 2 can be similarly obtained. When P1’s own
low-fare customer arrives, we note that it is optimal for P1 to accept her
own low-fare ordering request if r1L + V1 (t  1; n1   1; 0) > V1 (t  1; n1; 0)  c1L
(or, equivalently, 1 (t  1; n1; 0) < r1L + c1L). We can similarly obtain the 
From Definition 2.1, we note that i (t; ni; 0) is a function of the decision period t and
remaining inventory ni, and i (t; ni; 0) = Vi (t; ni; 0)  Vi (t; ni   1; 0), where ni > 1
and t > 1. We show the property of i (t; ni; 0) in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: For a given t, i (t; ni; 0) is non-increasing in ni; and for a given ni,
i (t; ni; 0) is non-decreasing in t.
Proof: We prove this lemma by induction. In the last period, i.e., t = 1,
i (1; ni; 0) = (iH + jHjH)riH + (iL + jLjL)riL. Clearly, i (1; ni; 0) is
non-increasing in ni. Now, suppose that i (t  1; ni; 0) is non-increasing in ni for any
t > 1. Then i (t; ni; 0) can be expressed as
i (t; ni; 0) = (1  iH   jHjH   iL   jLjL)i (t  1; ni; 0)
+ (iH + jHjH)i (t  1; ni   1; 0) + ~i, (3)
in which
~i =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(iL + jLjL)i (ni   1) , if i (ni)  i (ni   1) < riL;
iLi (ni   1) + jLjLriL, if i (ni) < riL  i (ni   1)
< riL + ciL;
iL(riL + ciL) + jLjLriL, if i (ni) < riL and
i (ni   1)  riL + ciL;
iLi (ni   1) + jLjLi (ni) , if riL  i (ni)  i (ni   1)
< riL + ciL;
iL(riL + ciL) + jLjLi (ni) , if riL  i (ni) < riL + ciL
 i (ni   1) ;
(iL + jLjL)i (ni) , if riL + ciL  i (ni)
 i (ni   1) .
(4)
For simplicity of notation, in (4) we use i (ni) and i (ni   1) to denote i (t  1; ni; 0)
and i (t  1; ni   1; 0), respectively.
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We find from (3) that i (t; ni; 0) is a non-negative and linear combination of
i (t  1; ni   1; 0) and i (t  1; ni; 0), which are non-increasing in ni. Therefore, by
induction, i (t; ni; 0) is non-increasing in ni for any t  1.
Rearranging (3), we obtain
i (t; ni; 0)  i (t  1; ni; 0)
= (iH + jHjH) [i (t  1; ni   1; 0)  i (t  1; ni; 0)]
+ ~i   (iL + jLjL)i (t  1; ni; 0) .
(5)
Considering the six cases shown in (4), we find that the RHS of (5) is always
non-negative for any given t. Thus i (t; ni; 0) is non-decreasing in t for any ni. 
Using the monotonic properties of i (t; ni; 0), we are able to simplify the optimal
accept/reject policy to sets of critical values for Pi, which can be used to control the
ordering process as follows:
 In a selling period t, there exist two critical (remaining) inventory levels, n^1i (t)
and n^2i (t) (with n^1i (t)  n^2i (t)), such that
1 any low-fare ordering request is accepted for n^2i (t) < ni
2 an ordering request from Pi’s own low-fare class is accepted while a
transferred low-fare ordering request is rejected for n^1i (t)  ni  n^2i (t)
3 any low-fare ordering request is rejected for ni < n^1i (t).
 Given Pi’s inventory ni, there exist two critical periods, t^1i (ni) and t^2i (ni)
(with t^1i (ni)  t^2i (ni)), such that
1 any low-fare ordering request is accepted for t < t^1i (ni)
2 an ordering request from Pi’s own low-fare class is accepted while a
transferred low-fare ordering request is rejected for t^1i (ni)  t  t^2i (ni)
3 any low-fare ordering request is rejected for t^2i (ni) < t.
Example 2.1: Consider the case when only one player has positive inventory in period
t. Without loss of generality, we assume that P2 has sold out all her products. Player
P1 has 30 products. The product price, rejection cost, and arrival and transfer rates of
K-fare class customers for Pi (K = L;H and i = 1; 2) are given in Table 1.
Table 1 Prices, rejection costs, arrival and transfer rates of P1 and P2
Low-fare (K = L) High-fare (K = H)
riL ciL iL iL riH ciH iH iH
P1 $99 $10 0.35 0.8 $159 $20 0.15 0.6
P2 $105 $12 0.25 0.75 $165 $25 0.10 0.65
For the parameter values given in Table 1, we can find three regions for P1’s optimal
accept/reject decisions (see Figure 3): In region R1, P1 accepts both her low-fare
customer and P2’s transferred customer. In region R2, P1 accepts only her low fare
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customer. And in region R3, P1 rejects any low-fare customer. Figure 3 shows that the
cutoff levels for the accept/reject regions are non-decreasing in time t. When there are
only a few time periods left and there is sufficient inventory, P1 accepts almost all her
low fare and transferred customers. On the other hand, when the time remaining is quite
long, P1 rejects her low fare and transferred customers if her inventory is low. 
Figure 3 Dynamic optimal decisions of P1 when P2’s products are sold out (see online
version for colours)
2.2 Case 2: Both players have inventories in period t
In this case, both players have positive inventories (i.e., n1; n2 > 0) at the beginning of
period t, and the transfer of high-fare customers will not happen between two players.
Hence, each player needs to decide whether to accept her own low-fare customer. If
a low-fare customer is rejected by a player, the customer may seek the product from
the other player. Thus each player also faces the choice of accepting or rejecting the
ordering request of a transferred customer.
Again, we consider the problem faced by P1, whose revenues under different
decisions in period t are presented in Figure 4. Here, P1’s expected total revenue can
be obtained by adding all the expressions on the right of Figure 4, and P2’s expected
total revenue can be similarly obtained. With some simplifications, we can find Pi’s
expected total revenue as:
Vi (t; ni; nj)
= max
xiL;yiL
fVi (t  1; ni; nj) + iHriH   iL (1  xiL) ciL
+ [iLxiL + iH + jLjL (1  xjL) yiL]
[Vi (t  1; ni   1; nj)  Vi (t  1; ni; nj)]
+ [jLxjL + jH + iLiL (1  xiL) yjL]
[Vi (t  1; ni; nj   1)  Vi (t  1; ni; nj)]
+ riL [jLjL (1  xjL) yiL + iLxiL]g ,
(6)
with Vi (0; ni; nj) = 0 for ni; nj > 0 (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j).
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According to Figure 4, when a transferred low-fare ordering request
occurs with P1, her expected revenue from accepting this request is
2L2L [r1L + V1 (t  1; n1   1; n2)], and her expected revenue from rejecting the
request is 2L2LV1 (t  1; n1; n2). We can expressP1’s optimal accept/reject decision
for a transferred low-fare customer fromP2 (i.e., y1L = 1 or 0) in terms of the expected
marginal value 1 (t  1; n1; n2):
y1L =

1, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2) < r1L;
0, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2)  r1L. (7)
Figure 4 P1’s expected revenue when both players have inventories at the beginning of
period t
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Next, we consider the situation in which P1’s own low-fare ordering request occurs.
This is more complicated since P1’s accept/reject decisions for her own low-fare
customers (i.e., x1L = 1 or 0) have to be made upon P2’s decisions on transferred
customers. If P2 decides to reject a transferred customer from P1, then P1’s optimal
accept/reject decision for her own low-fare customer is:
x1L =

1, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2) < r1L + c1L and P2 rejects;
0, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2)  r1L + c1L and P2 rejects. (8)
On the other hand, if P2 decides to accept a transferred customer, then the optimal
accept/reject decision for P1’s own low-fare customer will be
x1L =

1, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2) < 1 (t  1; n1; n2) and P2 accepts;
0, if 1 (t  1; n1; n2)  1 (t  1; n1; n2) and P2 accepts, (9)
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where 1 (t  1; n1; n2) = 1L1 (t  1; n1; n2) + r1L + c1L. Similarly, we can obtain
the optimal decisions for P2.
We note that, for Pi (i = 1; 2), there are four possible combinations of strategy mix
(xiL; yiL). To simplify the expression, we denote M1i as (1; 1), i.e., (xiL; yiL) = (1; 1),
and M2i , M3i , M4i as (0; 1), (1; 0), and (0; 0), respectively. Referring to (7) to (9), we
find that the optimal solution pair is determined in terms of i (t  1; ni; nj) and the
relations among the three critical values of riL, 1 (t  1; n1; n2), and riL + ciL. To
identify the optimal strategy mix in different situations, we examine the properties of
Vi (t; ni; nj).
Theorem 3: For any t 2 fT; T   1; :::; 1g, Vi (t; ni; nj) (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j) has the
following properties:
1 Vi (t; ni; nj) is non-decreasing in ni and non-increasing in nj
2 i (t; ni; nj) is non-increasing in ni and nj
3 i (t; ni; nj)  i (t; ni; nj), with 0    1, is non-increasing in ni and nj .
Proof: We use induction to prove this theorem. First, we verify these properties for the
last period (i.e., t = 1). Note that a player will accept any low-fare ordering request
in the last period as long as she has unsold products on hand. Then, from (6), we
obtain that Vi (1; ni; nj) = iHriH + iLriL for any ni; nj > 0. Thus, all properties in
the theorem hold.
Next, assuming that for any ni; nj > 0, these properties hold in period t  1 for
t > 1, we want to prove that the properties hold for period t. Properties (1) and (2)
indicate that Vi (t; ni; nj) is non-decreasing and quasi-concave in ni, and non-increasing
and quasi-concave in nj . We also note that i (t  1; ni; nj)  0 since Vi (t  1; ni; nj)
is non-increasing in nj . Thus, i (t  1; ni; nj)  riL + ciL. According to (7 to (9),
we describe Pi’s optimal strategy corresponding to Pj’s decisions in Figure 5. In any
situation, Pi should choose the corresponding strategy mix to maximise her expected
revenue. For instance, if Pj’s decisions in period t are xjL = 0 and yjL = 0, Pi’s
expected revenue will be
Vi (t; ni; nj) = (1  iH   iL   jL)Vi (t  1; ni; nj)
+ jL (1  jL)Vi (t  1; ni; nj)
+ iLmax [Vi (t  1; ni   1; nj)
+ riL; Vi (t  1; ni; nj)  ciL]
+ jLjLmax [Vi (t  1; ni   1; nj)
+ riL; Vi (t  1; ni; nj)]
+ iH [Vi (t  1; ni   1; nj) + riH ].
(10)
The RHS of (10) is a combination of terms that are non-decreasing and quasi-concave
in ni, and non-increasing and quasi-concave in nj . Thus, in this situation, properties
(1) and (2) hold. It is not difficult to validate that in other situations, Vi (t; ni; nj)
can also be expressed as a combination of terms that satisfy properties (1) and (2).
Using a similar procedure, we can prove that i (t; ni; nj)  i (t; ni; nj) (0    1)
is non-increasing in ni and nj . By induction, all of the properties are maintained in
period t. 
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Figure 5 Pi’s complete optimal strategy mixes corresponding to Pj’s decisions in period t,
(a) i (t  1; ni; nj) > riL (b) i (t  1; ni; nj)  riL
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The properties shown in Theorem 3 have the following implications:
 In period t, there exists a critical inventory level, n^i(t), for Pi, such that any
transferred low-fare ordering request should be accepted for ni > n^i(t) and
rejected for ni  n^i(t).
 The non-decreasing property of Vi(t; ni; nj) shows that Pi will be better off if Pj
has a smaller number of products unsold in period t. This is because each player
is more likely to reject a low-fare customer when her inventory level is low and
there are still many periods left.
 The non-increasing property of i(t; ni; nj) is consistent with the classical
‘marginal revenue decreasing’ law in economics.
Example 2.2: Using the parameter values in Table 1, we examine the optimal decisions
of one player, e.g., P1, for the case when both players have inventories. We assume that
P2 always adopts a first-come-first-served (FCFS) policy where x2L = y2L = 1; that is,
P2 accepts both her own low-fare customer and the transferred customer from P1. It is
obvious that this FCFS policy is non-optimal. Faced with this policy, P1 determines her
best response by solving (6) in each period. In Figure 6, we present P1’s accept/reject
regions for t = 10, 20, 30, and 40 (periods-to-go) and each player’s inventory level
equal to 10. As in Example 1, in region R1, P1 accepts both her low-fare customer
and P2’s transferred customer. In region R2, P1 accepts only her low fare customer;
Dynamic inventory control game for perishable products 95
and in region R3, she rejects any low-fare customer. It is worth noting that when t =
40, i.e., when there are 40 time periods left, P1 almost always rejects any low fare
customer; but when t = 10, she accepts both her low-fare customer and P2’s transferred
customer provided that both players have a sufficient number of products left. 
Figure 6 Dynamic best responses of P1 when both players have inventories and P2 follows
a (non-optimal) FCFS policy, (a) t = 10 (b) t = 20 (c) t = 30 (d) t = 40
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
3 Non-cooperative solution
In this section we examine two players’ decisions in Nash equilibrium when they make
their accept/reject decisions ‘simultaneously’ in each period, using the results obtained
in Section 2. For rational players, some optimal strategy mixes shown in Figure 5 may
not apply. For example, if P1 always accepts her own low-fare customer (x1L = 1)
in period t, there will be no transferred low-fare customer from P1 to P2. Thus,
V1 (t; n1; n2) (n1; n2 > 0) is the same for x1L = 1, y1L = 1 and x1L = 1, y1L = 0 if
x2L = 1. For the game problem in this section, we define the possible strategies of Pi
as follows:
1 U1i : accept any low-fare customer
2 U2i : accept only transferred low-fare customer
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3 U3i : accept only own low-fare customer
4 U4i : reject any low-fare customer.
Note that the third strategy ‘accept only own low-fare customer’ means that either the
transferred low-fare customers from the other player are rejected, or there are no such
customers. We describe Pi’s best response corresponding to Pj’s decisions in Figure 7.
In any situation, Pi should choose the corresponding strategy mix in order to maximise
her expected revenue.
Figure 7 Pi’s best response to Pj’s decisions in period t, (a) i (t  1; ni; nj) > riL
(b) i (t  1; ni; nj)  riL
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Mathematically, the Nash equilibrium strategy is a pair (UN1 ; UN2 ) where
UNi 2 fU1i ; U2i ; U3i ; U4i g for i = 1; 2, such that each player’s expected total revenue
with this mix is always better than those with other strategy mixes. This strategy
results in an equilibrium as it ensures that Pi (i = 1; 2) will not receive more than
Vi (t; ni; nj) with (UN1 ; UN2 ) if she deviates from it unilaterally. Before examining the
Nash equilibrium strategy, we need to investigate the optimal strategy of one player
in response to the strategy of the other player, which is the best response. According
to the optimal strategy mixes shown in Figure 7, we find that there are five mutually
exclusive cases in which Pi’s best response exhibits a unique form:
1 i < min(riL; i) : URi (Uj) =

U1i , if Uj = U2j , U4j ;
U3i , if Uj = U1j , U3j ;
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2 riL  i < i (when riL < i) : URi (Uj) = U3i for any Uj
3 i  i < riL (when i  riL) : URi (Uj) =
8>><>>:
U1i , if Uj = U4j ;
U2i , if Uj = U2j ;
U3i , if Uj = U3j ;
U4i , if Uj = U1j ;
4 max(riL; i)  i < riL + ciL : URi (Uj) =

U3i , if Uj = U3j , U4j ;
U4i , if Uj = U1j , U2j ;
5 riL + ciL  i : URi (Uj) = U4i , where i and i are for state (t  1; ni; nj).
Therefore, in total there are 25 different combinations of the best responses of two
players in the (U1; U2) plane. Due to the symmetrical property of these combinations,
we only investigate 15 of them and obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The game admits either a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple Nash
equilibria (MNE) for t 2 fT; T   1; :::; 1g and ni; nj > 0 (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j). The
unique Nash equilibrium and corresponding conditions are exhibited as:
(UNi ; U
N
j ) =8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(U1i ; U
4
j ), ifi < riL and j  rjL + cjL;
(U4i ; U
1
j ), ifi  riL + ciL and j < rjL;
(U3i ; U
4
j ), ifriL  i < riL + ciL and j  rjL + cjL;
(U4i ; U
3
j ), ifi  riL + ciL and rjL  j < rjL + cjL;
(U3i ; U
3
j ), if
8>>>><>>>>:
i < i and j < j , or
riL  i < riL + ciL and
rjL  j < rjL + cjL, or
i  i  riL and rjL < j < j when
i  riL and j > rjL;
(U4i ; U
4
j ), ifi  riL + ciL and j  rjL + cjL.
(11)
The multiple Nash equilibria and corresponding conditions can be expressed as:
(UNi ; U
N
j ) =8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(U1i ; U
4
j ) or (U3i ; U3j ), if
8>><>>:
i < riL and
max (rjL; j)  j < rjL + cjL;
or i < i and j  j < rjL
when i  riL and j  rjL;
(U4i ; U
1
j ) or (U3i ; U3j ), if
8>><>>:
max (riL; i)  i < riL + ciL
and j < rjL, or
i  i  riL and j < j
when i  riL and j  rjL;
(U1i ; U
4
j ), (U4i ; U1j ),
(U2i ; U
2
j ), or (U3i ; U3j ),
if i  i  riL and j  j  rjL
when i  riL and j  rjL.
(12)
In the above, i and i are for state (t  1; ni; nj), and j and j are for state
(t  1; nj ; ni).
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Proof: Using Pi’s best response discussed before, we find that if both players make their
decisions optimally, the game admits either a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple Nash
equilibria. Accordingly, we build three matrices to show Nash equilibrium in different
situations (see Figure 8). Grouping areas with the same Nash equilibrium, we obtain
(UNi ; U
N
j ) for each situation.
Figure 8 Nash equilibrium in period t
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We see that there exist two Nash equilibria, which are (U1i ; U4j ) and (U3i ; U3j ).
Comparing two players’ expected revenues in these two equilibria, we obtain
Vi j(U1i ;U4j )  Vi j(U3i ;U3j )= jLjL[riL   i(t  1; ni; nj)] + jLi(t  1; ni; nj)
and
Vj j(U1i ;U4j )  Vj j(U3i ;U3j )= jL[j(t  1; nj ; ni)  j(t  1; nj ; ni)].
It is easy to find that Vj j(U1i ;U4j )  Vj j(U3i ;U3j ) 0 since j(t  1; nj ; ni)  j(t  1;
nj ; ni).
We can find that Pj is better off in the equilibrium (U1i ; U4j ) than in (U3i ; U3j ).
However, this may not be the case for Pi because Vi j(U1i ;U4j )  Vi j(U3i ;U3j ) 0 cannot
be guaranteed. In addition, there are four Nash equilibria when i  i  riL and
j  j  rjL , which are (U1i ; U4j ), (U2i ; U2j ), (U3i ; U3j ), and (U4i ; U1j ). Referring to
Pi’s objective function, we have
Vi j(U1i ;U4j )= Vi(t  1; ni; nj) + iHriH + (jLjL + iL)riL
  (iL + iH + jLjL)i(t  1; ni; nj)  jHi(t  1; ni; nj),
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Vi j(U2i ;U2j )= Vi(t  1; ni; nj) + iHriH + jLjLriL   iLciL
  (iH + jLjL)i(t  1; ni; nj)  (jH + iLiL)i(t  1; ni; nj),
Vi j(U3i ;U3j )= Vi(t  1; ni; nj) + iHriH + iLriL
 (iL + iH)i(t  1; ni; nj)  (jL + jH)i(t  1; ni; nj),
and
Vi j(U4i ;U1j )= Vi(t  1; ni; nj) + iHriH   iLciL
  iHi(t  1; ni; nj)  (jL + jH + iLiL)i(t  1; ni; nj).
Comparing Pi’s expected revenue in each of these equilibria, we obtain that
Vi j(U4i ;U1j )  Vi j(U3i ;U3j )= iL(i   i)  0,
Vi j(U2i ;U2j )  Vi j(U1i ;U4j )= iL(i   i)  0,
and
Vi j(U4i ;U1j )  Vi j(U2i ;U2j ) = iLiL(i   riL)  iLi
 ( 1iL   jL)(riL   i) + ciLiL > 0.
Thus, (U4i ; U1j ) is superior to other three equilibria for Pi, whereas (U1i ; U4j ) is the best
equilibrium for Pj. 
This four Nash equilibria case is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.1: We use the parameter values in Table 2 for the product prices, rejection
costs, and arrival and transfer rates of K-fare class customers for Pi (K = L;H
and i = 1; 2). There are only two periods left and each player has only one unit of
product unsold. We calculate the expected revenues of two players for each strategy
combination, which are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that there exist four Nash equilibria, which are (U11 ; U42 ), (U21 ; U22 ),
(U31 ; U
3
2 ), and (U41 ; U12 ). Comparing the revenues generated in these equilibria, we find
that no equilibrium can make both players achieve the largest revenues at the same time.
The equilibrium (U41 ; U12 ) is the best for P1, and (U11 ; U42 ) is the best for P2. 
Example 3.1 demonstrates that in the multiple Nash equilibria case there is no unique
optimal strategy for each player. Thus, we cannot calculate each player’s expected total
revenue in that period. As a result, the optimal strategies for all the preceding periods
are also uncertain. However, our numerical experiments show that in most cases, the
game admits only one equilibrium. We illustrate the unique Nash equilibrium case in
the following example.
Table 2 Prices, rejection costs, arrival and transfer rates of P1 and P2 for the four Nash
equilibria case
Low-fare (K = L) High-fare (K = H)
riL ciL iL iL riH ciH iH iH
P1 $99 $2 0:10 1 $159 $5 0:45 1
P2 $105 $3 0:35 1 $165 $6 0:05 1
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Table 3 The expected revenues of two players with different strategy mixes
P1 :
U11 U
2
1 U
3
1 U
4
1
P2 U12 N/A N/A N/A (137.5,110.5)
U22 N/A (128.7, 118.5) N/A (122.5,90.1)
U32 N/A N/A (135.1,113) (133.2,104.8)
U42 (126.38,121.03) (124.4,112.9) (120.2,92.5) (118.3,84.4)
Example 3.2: We use the parameter values in Table 1 for the product prices, rejection
costs, and arrival and transfer rates for Pi (i = 1; 2). As in Example 2.2, we consider
four time periods (to-go), i.e., t = 10; 20; 30 and 40. Figure 9 shows six regions, which
are defined as follows. Region R1 corresponds to (U21 ; U22 ), that is, both players accept
only their low-fare customers. In region R2, we have (U41 ; U22 ) which corresponds to
P1 rejecting any low-fare customer and P2 accepting only her own low-fare customer.
In addition, regions R3, R4, R5, and R6 represent the equilibrium strategy combinations
of (U21 ; U42 ), (U41 ; U12 ), (U11 ; U42 ), and (U41 ; U42 ), respectively.
Figure 9 An example of Nash equilibrium, (a) t = 10 (b) t = 20 (c) t = 30 (d) t = 40
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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As seen from Figure 9, we note that when t = 40 (periods-to-go), both players reject
any low fare customer – hoping that high-fare customers will arrive in later periods.
However, when t = 10, for large (n1; n2) values, both players accept their own low-fare
customers. At t = 10, when a player has only a few units of products left, the player
will be more selective and reject any low-fare customers.
We have also compared the expected revenues for both players under two scenarios:
Scenario 1, in which P2 uses an arbitrary dynamic policy (i.e., FCFS) and P1 responds
optimally to P2’s decisions (see Section 2.2); and Scenario 2, in which both P1 and
P2 implement Nash equilibrium strategies as discussed in this section. We observe from
Table 4 that, as two players move from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2, P1’s expected revenue
decreases and P2’ expected revenue increases. 
Table 4 The expected revenues of two players in two scenarios: (1) P1 acts optimally and
P2 uses FCFS, (2) two players play a Nash game
t: Periods-to-go
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Scenario 1: P1 acts optimally and P2 uses FCFS rule with x2L = y2L = 1
V 1 : 826.2 1,050.1 1,119.6 1141.6 1163.4 1,185.4 1,211.9 1,239.3
V2: 801.9 1,086.1 1,169.7 1,163.7 1,157.3 1,151.3 1,142.9 1,133.5
Scenario 2: Both players use Nash equilibrium strategies
V N1 : 826.2 1,050.1 1,111.8 1,120.0 1,125.9 1,131.1 1,136.1 1,141.2
V N2 : 801.9 1,086.1 1,175.4 1,184.5 1,188.8 1,191.9 1,195.0 1,198.4
Change in revenue (%) as two players move from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2:
P1 : 0 0 –0.7 –1.9 –3.3 –4.8 –6.7 –8.6
P2 : 0 0 0.5 1.8 2.7 3.4 4. 5.4
4 Cooperative solution
We also investigate the case when two players cooperate with each other. For this case,
we assume that a player does not incur a rejection cost if an ordering request is satisfied
by its cooperative partner. In addition, we assume that the transfer rate between two
players is equal to one if a player’s rejected customer can be accepted by the other
player. This is because when two players cooperate, each player would encourage an
unsatisfied customer to transfer to the other (cooperative) player. In this cooperative
situation, two players jointly make decisions on whether to accept or reject an arriving
customer based on their inventory levels and the number of time periods remaining.
Since two players cooperate to maximise their total revenue, the optimal strategy mixes
may be different from those under the non-cooperative situation.
We denote V (t; n1; n2) as the maximum expected total revenue of two players in
state (t; n1; n2). In the last period, i.e., t = 1, two players should accept any ordering
request as long as there are products available. However, the ordering request should
be given to the player whose unit revenue per product is higher. Hence, the maximum
total expected revenue in state (1; n1; n2) can be expressed as
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V (1; n1; n2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0, if n1 = n2 = 0;P
K=L;H
(1K + 2K) r1K , if n1 > 0 and n2 = 0;P
K=L;H
(1K + 2K) r2K , if n1 = 0 and n2 > 0;P
K=L;H
(1K + 2K)max (r1K ; r2K) , if n1 > 0 and n2 > 0.
(13)
If one player has sold out all of her products before the end of the selling period,
then the maximum expected total revenue of the player having positive inventory can
be obtained from (2) and her optimal decisions would be the same as those shown in
Proposition 1.
Next, we will focus on the situation in which both players have unsold products. It
is possible that a player whose unit revenue from a high-fare customer is lower than that
of the other player may reject her own high-fare customer in order to maximise the total
revenue of two players. Without loss of generality, let P1 be the player who has a lower
unit revenue from a high-fare customer. We introduce an additional decision variable
for such a player, and denote x1H as the decision of P1 on her high-fare ordering
request, i.e.,
x1H =

1; P1 accepts her own high-fare customer, if any;
0; P1 rejects her own high-fare customer, if any.
Taking into account all other decisions which are similar to those presented in
Section 2.2 (as shown in Figure 4), we can calculate the expected total revenue of two
players with any possible combinations of decisions in period t as
V (t; n1; n2) = max
x1H ;x1L;y1L;x2L;y2L
fV (t  1; n1; n2)
+ 1H (1  x1H) [V (t  1; n1; n2   1)
  V (t  1; n1   1; n2) + r2H   r1H ]
+
P
i=1;2
friL [jL (1  xjL) yiL + iLxiL]
  iL (1  xiL) (1  yjL) ciL + iHriHg
+ [1Lx1L + 1H + 2L (1  x2L) y1L]
[V (t  1; n1   1; n2)  V (t  1; n1; n2)]
+ [2Lx2L + 2H + 1L (1  x1L) y2L]
[V (t  1; n1; n2   1)  V (t  1; n1; n2)]g ,
(14)
with V (0; n1; n2) = 0, n1; n2 > 0, and i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j).
According to the cases shown in (14), the optimal accept/reject decisions of the two
players under cooperation is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 5: In the cooperative situation, if two players have inventories
(i.e., ni; nj > 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j) at the beginning of period t and r1H < r2H ,
then two players’ optimal accept/reject decision rules are as follows:
1 P1 accepts her own high-fare customer if 1 > r2H   r1H , and rejects otherwise
2 Pi accepts her own low-fare customer if i > rjL   riL and i < riL + ciL
3 Pi rejects her own low-fare customer but Pj accepts her own low-fare customer
if i  rjL   riL and j < rjL + ciL
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4 both Pi and Pj reject their own low-fare customers if i  riL + ciL and
j  rjL + ciL; where 1 =  2 = V (t  1; n1   1; n2)  V (t  1; n1; n2   1),
and i and i are for state (t  1; n1; n2).
Proof: In order to determine the accept/reject decision on P1’s high-fare ordering
request, we compare the expected revenues under two decisions using (14):
V (t; n1; n2) =

V (t  1; n1; n2   1) + r2H , if reject
V (t  1; n1   1; n2) + r1H , if accept.
Hence, P1 should accept her own high-fare customer if V (t  1; n1   1; n2) + r1H >
V (t  1; n1; n2   1) + r2H (or equivalently, 1(t  1; n1; n2) > r2H   r1H ) and reject
it otherwise. Similarly, we obtain other accept/reject decisions when different ordering
requests occur. This completes the proof. 
From Proposition 5, we note that in the cooperative situation it might be optimal for P1
to reject her own high-fare class customer if such an action can improve the expected
total revenue of two players. We illustrate this result from cooperation and discuss its
managerial insight in the following example.
Example 4.1: We have shown in Example 3.1 that, in the case of multiple Nash
equilibria under competition, there is no equilibrium in which both players can
simultaneously achieve the largest revenues. Therefore, two players may be better off
by cooperation. We examine the cooperation between two players using the same
parameter values as those in Example 3.1. Based on the decision rules in Proposition 5,
we determine the optimal solutions as x1H = x1L = y1L = 0 and x2L = y2L = 1, and
obtain the expected revenues of two players in state (2; 1; 1) as V 1 = 104:25 and V 2 =
194:18. Comparing the solutions with the two players’ expected revenues in Table 3,
we see that although P1’s expected revenue is decreased, P2’s expected revenue is
significantly increased. As a result, the expected total revenue of two players is increased
by more than $50 on average, which accounts for about 17% of the total revenue
in the non-cooperative situation. Such an improvement in the joint revenue indicates
that cooperation is strongly recommended if two players can appropriately share their
revenue. 
We next investigate the structural properties of V (t; n1; n2) – the expected total revenue
of two players.
Theorem 6: Under cooperation, for any state (t; n1; n2) (t 2 fT; T   1; :::; 1g and
n1; n2 > 0), V (t; n1; n2) has the following properties:
1 V (t; n1; n2) is non-decreasing and quasi-concave in n1 and n2
2 V (t; n1; n2)  V (t  1; n1; n2) is non-decreasing in t, n1, and n2.
Proof: We prove this theorem by induction. First, consider property (1). From (13), it
is easy to verify that property (1) is satisfied for any n1 and n2 in period t = 1. Now
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suppose property (1) is valid for any n1 and n2 in period t  1 (t > 1). The expected
total revenue V (t; n1; n2) in (14) can be written as
V (t; n1; n2) = (1  1L   2L   1H   2H)V (t  1; n1; n2)
+ 1Lmax
8<:r1L + V (t  1; n1   1; n2)r2L + V (t  1; n1; n2   1)
V (t  1; n1; n2)  c1L
+ 2Lmax
8<:r2L + V (t  1; n1; n2   1)r1L + V (t  1; n1   1; n2)
V (t  1; n1; n2)  c2L
+ 1H max

r1H + V (t  1; n1   1; n2)
r2H + V (t  1; n1; n2   1)
+ 2H [r2H + V (t  1; n1; n2   1)] .
(15)
It is not difficult to find that V (t; n1; n2) is a positive and linear combination of five
non-decreasing and quasi-concave functions (by assumption). Hence, we can conclude
that V (t; n1; n2) for n1; n2 > 0 is also non-decreasing and quasi-concave in n1 and n2.
By induction, property (1) holds for V (t; n1; n2) in any period t.
Next, we prove property (2) for V (t; n1; n2). In terms of the marginal expected
revenue of Pi’s product, we find from Equation (15) that
V (t; n1; n2)  V (t  1; n1; n2)
= 2H (r2H   2 (t  1; n1; n2))
+ 1H max

r1H   1 (t  1; n1; n2)
r2H   2 (t  1; n1; n2)
+ 1Lmax
8<:r1L   1 (t  1; n1; n2)r2L   2 (t  1; n1; n2) c1L
+ 2Lmax
8<:r2L   2 (t  1; n1; n2)r1L   1 (t  1; n1; n2) c2L .
(16)
Each term on the RHS of (16) is non-decreasing in n1 and n2 since i (i = 1; 2)
for state (t  1; n1; n2) is always non-increasing in n1 and n2. Thus V (t; n1; n2) 
V (t  1; n1; n2) is also non-decreasing in n1 and n2. In other words, V (t; n1; n2)
is super-modular in (t; n1) and (t; n2). From the super-modularity of V (t; n1; n2),
we can see that i (t  1; n1; n2) is also non-increasing in t, which indicates that
the LHS of (16) is non-decreasing in t. Therefore, V (t; n1; n2)  V (t  1; n1; n2) is
non-decreasing in t, n1, and n2. This completes the proof. 
Similar to Theorem 3, the properties shown in Theorem 6 imply the existence of some
critical inventory level and selling period values, which can be used as ‘thresholds’ to
determine P1’s optimal accept/reject decisions as follows.
 For given values of t and n2, there exists a critical inventory level, n^1K(t; n2)
(for K = L;H), such that P1 should ‘assign’ the K-fare class customer to P2
when n1 < n^1K(t; n2), and accept it when n1  n^1K(t; n2).
 For given values of n1 and n2, there exists a critical ordering period, t^1K(n1; n2)
(for K = L;H), such that P1 should ‘assign’ the K-fare class customer to P2
when t < t^1K(n1; n2), and accept it when t  t^1K(n1; n2).
Dynamic inventory control game for perishable products 105
 There exists a critical state (t^; n^1; n^2) such that for any state where t > t^; n1 > n^1;
and n2 > n^2, the low-fare ordering request should be rejected by both players.
According to the optimal decision rules found in Proposition 5, there are 16 different
combinations of the five decision variables in the cooperative situation. The optimal
solution can be any of them. However, we can use the critical values in a specific state
to summarise each of these five decisions, e.g., for the given state variables t and n2,
the decision on P1’s high-fare class ordering request can be expressed as
X1H (t; n1; n2) =

1 (accept), if n1 < n^1K(t; n2);
0 (reject), otherwise,
where n^1H(t; n2) = minfn1 : 1 (t  1; n1; n2) > r2H   r1Hg. Compared to the
condition for X1H (t; n1; n2) in Proposition 5, this condition is easier to understand.
5 Conclusions and future research
We formulated a two-player two-fare-class game model for a perishable product
inventory control problem under both the non-cooperative and the cooperative situations.
The problem is complicated by the fact that one player’s accept/reject decisions in each
period are affected not only by her own inventory level, but also by the inventory level
of the other player who sells a substitutable product in the same geographic market.
Comparing the results for the non-cooperative and the cooperative situations, we gain
the following insights. First, in the non-cooperative situation, each player’s optimal
revenue is a non-decreasing function of her own inventory level and a non-increasing
function of the other player’s inventory level at any time. Using the expected marginal
value approach, we simplify the optimal accept/reject decisions into sets of threshold
values, which can significantly reduce the computation time of the optimal solutions
on the computer. Second, for the non-cooperative Nash game setting, we show the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium of dynamic accept/reject decisions for two players in
most of the situations. Third, in the presence of cooperation between two players, we
find two players’ optimal strategies, and our numerical results show that the expected
total revenue of two players can be increased by 17% over that in the non-cooperative
situation.
An extension to our study could be to consider the incomplete information game
in the context of multiple periods, and examine the existence of perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and its uniqueness for this game. Another extension could be to consider
three or more players in which two or more players may cooperate to increase their total
expected revenue while competing with other players. A third possible extension would
be to consider the buy-up action of the lower-fare customers; however, the multi-way
transfers of these ‘unstable’ customers could greatly complicate the structure of the
model and increase the difficulty of proving the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium solutions. Lastly, we might consider the situation where customers may be
allowed to cancel their orders or return the products.
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